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Summary
On May 31, 2006, U.S. and Vietnamese negotiators signed a bilateral agreement
on the conditions for Vietnam’s accession (entry) into the World Trade Organization
(WTO).  The agreement is just one in a number of steps that Vietnam must take to
complete its 11-year quest to join the multilateral trade body.  However, the
agreement with the United States was the last and, seemingly, the most difficult  of
the bilateral agreements that Vietnam had to negotiate with twenty-eight WTO
members (including the European Union (EU) counting as one but representing
twenty-five countries).  Thus, the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral agreement on WTO
accession signifies that Vietnam’s accession process is drawing to a close.
The U.S. Congress has no direct role in Vietnam’s accession to the WTO.
Congressional approval of the bilateral agreement is not required for it to go into
effect. Vietnam’s accession to the WTO would require the United States and
Vietnam to adhere to WTO rules in their bilateral trade relations, including not
imposing unilateral measures, such as quotas on textile imports, that have not been
sanctioned by the WTO.  
On the other hand, the Congress has an indirect role to play.  As has been the
case with U.S. trade relations with most of the other communist and former
communist states, U.S. trade relations with Vietnam are governed by Title IV of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended, which includes the so-called Jackson-Vanik
amendment (section 402).  Title IV prohibits the President from granting those
countries most-favored-nation (MFN) status, now called normal trade relations
(NTR) in U.S. law, unless the country has met certain conditions.   However, the
WTO requires its members to extend unconditional MFN (permanent NTR (PNTR))
in order to receive the benefits of WTO membership in their bilateral trade relations.
In order for the President to gain the authority to grant Vietnam unconditional MFN/
PNTR status, Congress would have to enact legislation removing Vietnam from Title
IV coverage. 
Accession to the WTO would afford Vietnam the protection of the multilateral
system of rules in its trade relations with other WTO members, including the United
States.  It would help the United States in that Vietnam would be obligated to apply
WTO rules in its trade. PNTR status from the United States would provide Vietnam
more predictability its growing trade relations with the United States and would shed
a legacy of the cold war.  For the United States, PNTR would be another in a series
of steps the United States has taken in trade and foreign policy to normalize relations
with Vietnam and place distance between current relations and the Vietnam War.
During the congressional debate on PNTR Members might raise issues
regarding the conditions for Vietnam’s entry into the WTO and other issues
pertaining to the U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship and other aspects of the overall
U.S.-Vietnam relationship.  Legislation (S. 3495 and H.R. 5602) regarding PNTR
status for Vietnam has been introduced in the 109th Congress.  The Congress has
several options on how to act on this issue. 
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Vietnam PNTR Status and WTO Accession:
Issues and Implications for the United
States
Introduction
On May 31, 2006, U.S. and Vietnamese negotiators signed a bilateral agreement
on the conditions for Vietnam’s accession (entry) into the World Trade Organization
(WTO).  The agreement is just one in a number of steps that Vietnam must take to
complete its 11-year quest to join the multilateral trade body. However, the
agreement with the United States was the last and, seemingly, the most difficult  of
the bilateral agreements that Vietnam had to negotiate with twenty-eight WTO
members (including the European Union (EU) counting as one but representing
twenty-five countries).  Thus, the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral agreement on WTO
accession signifies that Vietnam’s accession process is drawing to a close.
The U.S. Congress has no direct role in Vietnam’s accession to the WTO.
Congressional approval of the bilateral agreement is not required for it to go into
effect.  The agreement itself does not establish any new obligations on the part of the
United States, only on the part of Vietnam.  However, Vietnam’s accession to the
WTO would require the United States and Vietnam to adhere to WTO rules in their
bilateral trade relations, including not imposing unilateral measures, such as quotas
on textile imports, that have not been sanctioned by the WTO.  
On the other hand, the Congress has an indirect role to play.  As has been the
case with U.S. trade relations with most of the other communist and former
communist states, U.S. trade relations with Vietnam are governed by Title IV of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended, which includes the so-called Jackson-Vanik
amendment (section 402).  Title IV prohibits the President from granting those
countries most-favored-nation (MFN), called normal trade relations (NTR) in U.S.
law, unless the country has met certain conditions.   However, the WTO requires its
members to extend unconditional MFN (permanent NTR (PNTR)) in order to receive
the benefits of WTO membership in their bilateral trade relations.  In order for the
President to gain the authority to grant Vietnam unconditional MFN/ PNTR status,
Congress would have to enact legislation removing Vietnam from Title IV coverage.
Accession to the WTO is important to Vietnam.  It would afford Vietnam the
protection of the multilateral system of rules in its trade relations with other WTO
members, including the United States.  Vietnam would also participate in the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA) round of negotiations that are underway to expand the
coverage of the WTO. PNTR from the United States would provide more
predictability to Vietnam’s growing trade relations with the United States and would
shed a legacy of the cold war.  For the United States, PNTR would be another in a
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series of steps the United States has taken in trade and foreign policy to normalize
relations with Vietnam and place distance between current relations and the Vietnam
War.  It would also place the United States on par with Vietnam’s other major trading
partners, all of whom have granted Vietnam unconditional MFN status.  
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO would require Vietnam to conduct its trade
with the United States under a system of multilateral accepted rules.  Vietnam’s
trading practices would be subject to challenges by the United States and other WTO
members under the accepted dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
On June 13, 2006, companion bills — S. 3495 (Baucus) and H.R. 5602
(Ramstad) — authorizing PNTR for Vietnam were introduced in the Senate and the
House. More bills may follow.  The Congress has several options in how to act on
this issue.  During the congressional debate on PNTR Members might  raise issues
regarding the conditions for Vietnam’s entry into the WTO and other issues
pertaining to the U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship.  Members might also raise
issues pertaining to other aspects of the overall U.S.-Vietnam relationship.
This report is designed to assist
the 109th Congress as its considers
the question of PNTR for Vietnam
and the related issue of Vietnam’s
accession to the WTO.  To do so,
the report provides a brief overview
of the U.S.-Vietnam economic
relationship, an examination of the
WTO accession process and
Vietnam’s status, an overview of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment and
PNTR, an analysis of the issues that
may arise during congressional
consideration of PNTR for Vietnam,
and options available to the
Congress. This report will be
updated as events warrant.      
  
Overview of U.S.- Vietnam Economic Relations
U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic and economic relations remained essentially frozen
for more than a decade after communist North Vietnam’s victory over U.S.-backed
South Vietnam in 1975.  Relations took major steps forward in the mid-1990s,
particularly in 1995, when the two sides re-established formal diplomatic relations.
Since then, the normalization process has accelerated and bilateral ties have
expanded, particularly on the economic side of the relationship.  The most important
step toward normalization since 1995 was the signing of a sweeping bilateral trade
agreement (BTA), which was approved by Congress and signed by President Bush
in 2001 (P.L. 107-052)   Under the BTA, the United States and Vietnam extended
Vietnam Country Data
Population:  83.5 million (July 2005 est.)
Median Age:  25.5 years (U.S. = 36.3 years)
Area: 329,560 km2 (slightly larger than New
Mexico)
Life Expectancy:  70.61 years (2005)
Per Capita GDP:  $3,000 (2005) purchasing power
parity basis
Current Account Balance: - $1.7 billion (2005)
Primary Export Partners:  U.S. 20.2%, Japan
13.6%, China 9%, Australia 7% (2004)
Primary Import Partners: China 13.7%, Taiwan
11.3%, South Korea 10.8%, Japan 10.5%,
Singapore 10.5% (2004) 
Major Export Items: crude oil, clothing, footwear,
marine products
Dong:Dollar Exchange Rate: 15,855 (2005),
15,746 (2004), 15,510 (2003), 15,280 (2002).
Source:  CIA World Factbook, January 10, 2006.
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mutual MFN (NTR) to one another, that went into effect on December 10, 2001.  In
return, Hanoi agreed to a range of trade liberalization measures and market-oriented
reforms.  The climate in trade relations between Hanoi and Washington has sobered
considerably since the heady days after the BTA was signed, in part because of
difficult bilateral negotiations over the terms of Vietnam’s accession to the World
Trade Organization  (WTO) and anti-dumping duties the United States has leveled
against imports of Vietnamese shrimp and catfish.
Implementation of the 2001 Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA)
In general, since the BTA was signed in 2001, U.S. trade officials have praised
Vietnam’s implementation of the agreement.  As discussed below, in retrospect,
Vietnam’s contentious and prolonged debate over whether to sign the BTA was
watershed event that helped break the logjam that for years had stalled economic
policymaking.  The decision to sign the BTA appears to have fashioned a new
consensus in favor of a new economic reformist push.  In short order after signing the
BTA, the government enacted a series of measures, including passing a new
Enterprise Law, passing constitutional amendment giving legal status to the private
sector, reducing red tape, creating unprecedented transparency rules for prior
publication of new rules and regulations, and, for the first time, giving party members
the green light to engage in private business.  Adhering to the BTA’s implementation
deadlines and achieving the government’s goal of joining the WTO have helped
galvanize the Vietnamese bureaucracy toward enacting many of these and other steps.
Some U.S. industry officials have expressed concern that the government has
not met deadlines to implement in law and/or in practice some of concessions,
particularly in the services sector.  Many of these critics, however, tend to accept the
argument that the slippages often are due more to weak capacity than to protectionist
intentions, and in 2005 Vietnam passed more than 20 laws and regulations that
belatedly address some of these concerns.  The belief that Hanoi generally is
attempting to comply with its BTA obligations may explain why the Bush
Administration appears not to have criticized harshly Vietnam in areas where
implementation has been delayed or incomplete, with the exception of intellectual
property rights (see below).
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1 Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment, The Impact of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral
Trade Agreement on Overall and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam, (Hanoi:
National Political Publisher, 2005).  USAID provided funding and technical support for the
development of the Vietnamese report.  Economist Intelligence Unit, Vietnam Country
Report, April 2006; USTR, 2006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers, March 31, 2006.





to Vietnam Total Trade
Trade
Balance
1994 50.5 172.2 222.7 121.7
2000 827.4 330.5 1,157.9 -496.9
2001 1,026.4 393.8 1,420.2 -632.6
2002 2,391.7 551.9 2,943.6 -1,839.8
2003 4,472.0 1,291.1a 5,763.1 -3,180.9
2004 5,161.1 1,121.9a 6,283.0 -4,039.2
2005 6,522.3 1,151.3 7,673.6 -5,371.0
Major Imports 
from Vietnam
clothing, footwear, wooden furniture, frozen shrimp, petroleum
products, cashew nuts, coffee
Major Exports
to Vietnam
aircraft, mining equipment, electronic machinery, steel wire, raw
cotton, plastics
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission.  Data are for merchandise trade on a customs basis.
a.  U.S. exports from 2003 include Vietnam Airlines’ $700 million purchase of several Boeing 777s.
U.S. aircraft exports to Vietnam totaled over $360 million in 2004 and nearly $170 million in
the first half of 2005.
Aggregate U.S.-Vietnam Trade
From 2001 to 2005,  bilateral trade has more than quintupled from $1.4 billion
to over $7.6 billion (see Table 1).  Almost all of the increase in trade since the BTA
went into effect has been from increased U.S. imports of mainly apparel products
from Vietnam, which rose from just over $1 billion in 2001 to over $6.5 billion four
years later.  The United States is now Vietnam’s largest export market, and according
to one study, U.S. firms constitute the single-largest source of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Vietnam.  U.S. FDI has increased by an average of 27 percent
a year from 2002 through 2004, compared to just around 3 percent a year from 1996
to 2001.1   Vietnam ranks 38th as a source of U.S. imports and 58th as a U.S. export
market. 
In comparison to imports from Vietnam, growth in U.S. exports to Vietnam has
been modest, and since 2003 they have been concentrated mainly in aircraft.  Indeed,
U.S. exports to Vietnam have fallen since 2003, largely because shipments of aircraft
and aircraft parts have decreased.
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Trade in Apparel
Imports of clothing from Vietnam have been a major issue for U.S. apparel
manufacturers before, during, and after the negotiations over Vietnam’s WTO
accession. Nearly half of the increase in U.S.-Vietnam trade since 2001 has come
from a sharp rise in clothing imports from Vietnam, which totaled $2.7 billion in
2005.  This contrasts with less than $50 million in 2000 and 2001.  By dollar value,
apparel (excluding footwear) now represents about 40% of total U.S. imports from
Vietnam, which accounted for 4.3% of total U.S. clothing imports in 2005, compared
with 0.1% in 2001 (before the 2001 BTA went into effect) and 1.4% in 2002.
Increases in U.S. imports of Vietnamese apparel have continued into the first few
months of 2006.
Since 2001, Vietnam’s apparel exports to the United States have increased
more rapidly than U.S. clothing imports from China.  The latter have grown faster
after import quotas on textiles and apparel for WTO members expired on January 1,
2005; the continued rise in Vietnamese exports of apparel, however, suggests
continuing competitiveness of Vietnamese-produced clothing.  Although the dollar
amount of its clothing exports to the United States is far less than that of China,
Vietnam is the sixth largest exporter of apparel to the United States at about the same
order of magnitude of such exporters as India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, whose
clothing exports to the United States also have been rising rapidly.  Mexico’s apparel
exports to the United States, almost equal to those of China in 2001, actually have
decreased since then; and apparel exports to the United States by Hong Kong,
Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines also have fallen or risen
slowly (see Appendix A).
The growth in U.S. imports of Vietnamese apparel from 2001 to 2002 and in
subsequent years has been fairly widespread among product groups, but with outer
garments (rather than undergarments and T-shirts, for example) accounting for much
of the totals.  Thus, trousers, coats, jackets, and other lightweight outer garments
accounted for more than half of Vietnamese exports of clothing to the United States
in 2005 (see Appendix B).  In contrast to textile and apparel trade with a number of
other countries, the United States imports very small quantities of non-apparel textile
end-products from Vietnam. Also, U.S. apparel exports to Vietnam are relatively
minimal — equal to less than 1% of imports of apparel from Vietnam in 2004 and
2005 on a dollar basis.
The post-2001 surge in clothing imports from Vietnam followed the granting
by the United States of conditional normal trade relations (NTR) status to Vietnam
in December 2001 as per the July 2001 BTA.  Such status greatly reduced U.S. tariffs
on most imports from Vietnam and led to the very large increase in exports of apparel
to the United States.  Many Members of Congress had urged the Administration to
negotiate a special bilateral textile agreement to address this threat.  An April 2003
agreement between the United States and Vietnam maintains  quotas on 38 categories
of Vietnam’s clothing exports with the quota-levels increasing annually.
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2  “Special 301” refers to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974.  Since the start of the
Special 301 provision in 1989, the USTR has issued annually a three-tier list of countries
judged to have inadequate regimes for IPR protection: (1) priority foreign countries are
deemed to be the worst violators, and are subject to special investigations and possible trade
sanctions; (2) priority watch list countries are considered to have major deficiencies in their
IPR regime, which merit bilateral attention in these areas; and (3) watch list countries,
which maintain IPR practices that are of particular concern, but do not yet warrant higher-
level designations. 
3  USTR, 2006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 31, 2006.
4 [http://www.iipa.com]
5 For more on U.S. aid to Vietnam, see CRS Report RL32636, U.S. Assistance to Vietnam.
6 Vietnam qualified for the designation in part because of its demonstrated commitment to
fighting the epidemic on its own and because of the competency of its medical institutions.
Vietnam is estimated to have about 100,000 people living with the HIV-AIDS virus, a
number that is projected to grow significantly.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)  
Beginning in 2002, the Bush Administration has annually placed Vietnam on
its “Special 301 watch list” for allegedly poor protection of intellectual property
rights, particularly in the areas of music recordings and trademark protection.2  The
BTA required Vietnam to make its IPR regime WTO-consistent by the end of 2003.
The United States Trade Representative’s 2006 report on foreign trade barriers states
that Vietnam has made “considerable progress” in establishing the legal framework
for IPR protection, singling out the passage of a new intellectual property law in
November 2005.  Despite these efforts, the government’s enforcement of IPR
protection “remains extremely weak,” according to the USTR report, which cites
industry estimates that piracy rates for software, music, and videos run over 90
percent.3  The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA)  estimated U.S. trade
losses from Vietnam piracy at $42.8 million in 2005.4
U.S. Bilateral Economic Assistance to Vietnam5
As the U.S.-Vietnam normalization process has proceeded, the United States has
eliminated most of the Cold War-era restrictions on U.S. aid to Vietnam, and U.S.
assistance has increased markedly since around $1 million was provided when
assistance was resumed in 1991.  U.S. assistance reached an estimated $60 million
in FY2005, about three times the level in FY2000.  By far the largest component of
the current U.S. bilateral aid program is health-related assistance — particularly
spending on HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention — which amounted to nearly $40
million in FY2005.  Vietnam is a “focus country” eligible to receive increased
funding to combat HIV-AIDS under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR).6  In recent years, some Members of Congress have attempted to link
increases in non-humanitarian aid to progress in Vietnam’s human rights record. (See
the “Human Rights” section below.) 
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7  MFN status had been initially suspended for the Soviet Union all areas under the control
of international communism (except Yugoslavia) since 1951, as required by the Trade
Agreement Extension Act of 1951.  MFN status for Poland was restored in 1960. This
authority was superceded first by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and then Title IV of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended.    
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Vietnam’s NTR
Status
“Normal trade relations” (NTR), or “most-favored-nation” (MFN), trade status
is used to denote nondiscriminatory treatment of a trading partner compared to that
of other countries.  In practice, duties on the imports from a country that has been
granted NTR status are set at lower rates than those from countries that do not receive
such treatment.  Thus, imports from a non-NTR country can be at a large price
disadvantage compared with imports from NTR-status countries.
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment
Section 401 of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 requires the President to
continue to deny nondiscriminatory status  to any country that was not receiving such
treatment at the time of the law’s enactment on January 3, 1975, but established a
procedure (the Jackson-Vanik amendment) to restore MFN status.  In effect this
meant all communist countries, including Vietnam, except Poland and Yugoslavia.7
Section 402 of Title IV,  the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, denies the
countries eligibility for NTR status as well as access to U.S. government financial
facilities, such as the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), as long as the country denies its citizens the right of freedom of
emigration. 
 
These restrictions can be removed if the President  determines  that the country
is in full compliance with the freedom-of-emigration conditions set out under the
Jackson-Vanik amendment.  For a country to maintain that status,  the President must
reconfirm his determination of full compliance in semiannual reports (due by June
30 and December 31) to Congress.  His determination can be overturned by the
enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval concerning the December 31st report.
The Jackson-Vanik amendment also permits the President to waive full
compliance with the freedom-of-emigration requirements if he determines that such
a waiver would promote the objectives of the amendment, that is, encourage
freedom of emigration.  This waiver authority is subject to annual renewal by the
President and to possible congressional disapproval via a joint resolution.
Before a country can receive NTR treatment under either the presidential
determination of full compliance or the presidential waiver, it must have concluded
a bilateral agreement that provides for, among other things,  reciprocal extension of
NTR or MFN treatment. The agreement and a presidential proclamation extending
NTR status cannot go into effect unless a joint resolution approving the agreement
is enacted.  That legislation is to be given fast-track consideration as per provisions
of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.    
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8  Because Vietnam would still be designated a “nonmarket economy,” in U.S. antidumping
duty (AD) cases against Vietnam, AD margins are used using a methodology that invariably
leads to higher AD duties than is the case with market economies.  The nonmarket/market
economy status is determined by the International Trade Administration at the U.S.
Department of Commerce after reviewing several criteria — the extent to which a country’s
currency is convertible, its wage rates are determined by free bargaining between
management and labor, joint ventures or foreign investment are permitted, the government
owns  the means of production, and  the government determines prices.
Vietnam’s NTR Status 
President Clinton first granted Vietnam a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik
requirements in 1998.  That waiver has been upheld since that time. From 1998 to
2002, resolutions disapproving the waivers failed in the House.  Disapproval
resolutions were not introduced in 2003, 2004, or 2005.  The presidential waiver gave
Vietnam access to Export-Import Bank credits and OPIC programs, but Vietnam was
ineligible to receive NTR status until the United States and Vietnam entered into a
bilateral agreement per the requirements under Title IV.  In July 2000, the two
countries signed a bilateral trade agreement (BTA).  The agreement went into effect
after the Congress and Vietnam’s National Assembly approved it in 2001.  The
President signed it into law (P.L. 107-052) on October 16, 2001.  On December 10,
2001, conditional NTR for Vietnam went into effect.   
Of the countries that have been covered by the Jackson-Vanik amendment only
Cuba and North Korea are not accorded U.S. NTR status at all. Besides Vietnam,
Belarus and Turkmenistan are granted conditional NTR status under the President’s
waiver authority. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan are granted conditional NTR under the full compliance provision of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment.  All other communist and former communist countries
have been granted PNTR.  Most recently, Ukraine was granted PNTR on March 23,
2006. 
Implications of PNTR on the U.S.-Vietnam Relationship
PNTR for Vietnam would not have any direct impact on U.S.-Vietnam trade
relations.  Because Vietnam already has conditional NTR, its imports already receive
non-discriminatory treatment;  and therefore, U.S. importers of Vietnamese products
are charged the lower, concessional (MFN) tariff rates.  
PNTR would not affect Vietnam’s status as a “nonmarket economy” as regards
to U.S. antidumping laws. Vietnam had sought but failed to get U.S. removal of the
“non-market economy” designation as part of the agreement on WTO accession.8  
For Vietnam and for U.S. businesses that want to conduct business with and in
Vietnam, PNTR would provide a sense of predictability.  No longer would Vietnam’s
trade status with the United States be subject to annual reviews and possible
termination.  
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In addition to the practical commercial effects, PNTR would have politically
symbolic implications.  It would place U.S. relations on a higher plane.  The Jackson-
Vanik requirements are viewed by many of the countries that are subject to them as
an outdated legacy of the Cold War when U.S. foreign policy was designed to limit
Soviet influence, and trade policy was subservient to those foreign policy objectives.
U.S. policy now is to expand relations with many of the those countries, and reflects
the changing climate in U.S. relations with former Cold War adversaries.
       
The WTO Accession Process and Vietnam’s Status
Vietnam applied to join the WTO on January 1, 1995.  The bilateral WTO
accession agreement with the United States signifies that its 11-year quest is about
to be complete, but a few more important steps remain.
The Accession Process
The WTO’s membership of 149 countries and customs areas spans all levels of
economic development, from the least developed to the most highly developed
economies.  The WTO came into existence in January 1995 as a part of the
agreements reached by the signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).  The WTO’s primary purpose is to administer the roughly 60 agreements
and separate commitments made by its members as part of the GATT (for trade in
goods), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS — for trade in services),
and the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS). 
 The membership in the GATT/WTO  has grown exponentially.  The GATT was
originally founded in 1947 by 23 countries, and the WTO now has 149 members,
accounting for around 90% of world trade.  Among the most recent entrants are
China and Taiwan, which joined on December 11, 2001, and January 1, 2002,
respectively, Armenia, which joined on February 5, 2003,  the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, which  joined on April 4, 2003, Cambodia and Nepal which
joined in 2004.   The most recent entrant is Saudi Arabia, which joined on December
11, 2005.  Ukraine is near completion of its accession process. 
Membership in the WTO commits its members to fundamental principles in
trade with other members, including:
! Most-favored nation (MFN) treatment : The imports of goods and
services originating from one member country will be treated no less
favorably than imports of goods and services from any other member
country.  MFN is to be unconditional. In practical terms, this means
that in most cases a country cannot apply a higher import tariff to a
good from one member country than it applies to like goods from
any other member country.   
! National treatment:  Imports of goods and services are treated no
less favorably than like goods and services produced domestically.
In practical terms this means that governments cannot discriminate
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against imports in the application of laws and regulations, such as
regulations to protect consumer safety or the environment.
! Transparency:  Government laws and regulations that affect
foreign trade and investment are to be published and available for
anyone to see.  Procedures to  implement the laws and regulations
are to be open.
! Lowering Trade Barriers Through Negotiations:   Since the
GATT’s  creation, its members have conducted eight rounds of
negotiations to lower trade barriers.  At first these negotiations
focused on lowering tariffs.  Over time, the rounds have  broadened
GATT/WTO coverage to include  nontariff barriers, such as
discriminatory government procurement practices, discriminatory
standards, and trade-distorting  government subsidies.   The last
completed round, the Uruguay Round (1986-94), resulted in the
most ambitious expansion of rules to cover, for the first time, trade
in agricultural products and services and government policies and
practices pertaining to intellectual property rights protection and
foreign investment regulations that affect trade.  The current round,
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), was launched in November
2001.
! Reliance on tariffs: In order to promote predictability and openness
in commerce, the WTO requires member countries to use tariffs and
avoid using quotas or other nontariff measures when restricting
imports for legitimate purposes, such as on injurious imports.
! Dispute settlement:  As part of its function to administer the rules
established under the agreements, the WTO provides a mechanism
for the settlement of disputes between members where the dispute
involves alleged violations of WTO agreements.  Moreover, each
member’s trade regime is reviewed by the WTO Secretariat from
time-to-time to ensure that it conforms to WTO rules. 9 
       The collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc and  the movement
of many developing countries toward liberal trade policies have spurred interest in
joining the WTO.  Article XII of the agreement that established the WTO sets out the
requirements and procedures for countries to “accede.”: “Any state or customs
territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies is eligible to accede
to the WTO on terms agreed between it and WTO members.”   
The accession process begins with a letter from the applicant to the WTO
requesting membership.  The WTO General Council, the governing body of the
WTO when the  Ministerial Conference is not meeting, forms a multilateral Working
Party (WP) to consider the application.  Membership on the WP is open to any
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interested member-country.   More than sixty member countries, including the United
States, are part of the WP for Vietnam’s accession. 
The applicant submits a memorandum to the multilateral WP that describes in
detail its current trade regime.  The applicant and the WP then negotiate to determine
what legislative and structural changes the applicant must make to meet WTO
requirements and to establish the terms and conditions for entry of the applicant into
the WTO.    The WP’s findings are then included in a “Report of the Working Party”
and form the basis for drawing up the “Protocol of Accession.”
While it negotiates with the WP, the applicant must also conduct bilateral
negotiations with each interested WTO member.  During these negotiations the WTO
member indicates what concessions and commitments  on trade in goods and services
it wants the applicant to make in order to gain entry, and the applicant indicates what
concessions and commitments it is willing to make until the two agree and set down
the terms.  The terms of the bilateral agreements are combined into one document
which will apply on an MFN basis to all WTO members once the applicant has
joined the WTO.  The accession package is conveyed to the General Council or
Ministerial Conference for approval.  
Article XII does not establish a deadline for the process.  The length of the
process depends on a number of factors:  how many legislative and structural changes
an applicant must make in its trade regime in order to meet the demands of the WP;
how quickly its national and sub- national legislatures can make those changes; and
the demands on the applicant made by members in bilateral negotiations and the
willingness of the applicant to accept those demands.  The Vietnamese National
Assembly has passed, or is committed to pass, laws in response to demands from
WTO members.   Because WTO accession is a political process as well as a legal
process, its success depends on the political will of all sides — the WTO member
countries and  the applicant country.  A formal vote is taken in the WTO that requires
a 2/3 majority for accession, although in practice the WTO has sought to gain a
consensus on each application.  The process can take a long time:  China’s
application took over 15 years. 
Bilateral Agreement with the United States
Vietnam’s bilateral agreement with the United States is not a free trade
agreement, such as NAFTA or CAFTA.   It establishes conditions for Vietnam’s
entry into the WTO but imposes no new conditions on the United States.   For that
reason it does not require congressional approval as with FTAs.   
Vietnam’s agreement with the United States is the last of the 28 bilateral
agreements Vietnam needed to conclude as part of the accession process.  Vietnam
also concluded agreements with the EU, Korea, Japan, China, and Taiwan, among
others.  Vietnam still needs to complete the negotiations with the multilateral
working party that consists of 63 WTO members, including the United States. The
details of the bilateral agreement had not been released at the time of this writing.
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Nevertheless, the Office of the USTR has provided some general information about
the agreement’s contents.10
The most controversial issue, at least for the U.S. textile and wearing apparel
industry, is what reforms would Vietnam make regarding government subsidies for
its textile and apparel industry, and what protections would the U.S. industry be
given against surges in U.S. textile and apparel imports from Vietnam.
The U.S.-Vietnam bilateral WTO accession agreement commits Vietnam to
remove all WTO-prohibited trade government export subsidies for its textiles and
wearing apparel industry by the time of accession.  The agreement includes an
enforcement mechanism that is in effect for the first 12 months after Vietnam’s
accession.   Under this mechanism, if the United States or any other WTO member
has reason to believe that Vietnam has not fulfilled this commitment, it could seek
consultations with Vietnam.  If the consultations do not resolve the issue, then the
United States (or other WTO member) could seek the authority of a third party in the
form of a neutral WTO arbitrator who would then determine whether Vietnam is in
compliance.   If the arbitrator determines that Vietnam is not in compliance, then the
United States would be authorized to re-impose those quotas on textile and wearing
apparel imports from Vietnam before Vietnam entered the WTO.  Those quotas
could be in force up to 12 months.  If the arbitrator does not render a decision within
120 days of the filing of the complaint, then the United States would automatically
be authorized to impose the quotas. 
Among other concessions regarding manufactured goods, according to the
Office of the USTR, Vietnam will:
! accede to the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement (ITA)
upon accession, thus eliminating tariffs on information technology
products, such as computers, cell phones, and modems;
!  reduce tariffs on 80% of chemical products as required by the WTO
Chemical Harmonization Agreement;
! eliminate tariffs or aircraft and engines within seven years of its
WTO accession;
! lift the ban on large motorcycles (e.g. Harley Davidson models) and
reduce tariffs on SUVs and on autoparts; 
! eliminate tariffs on 91% of medical equipment products within five
years of accession and eliminate tariffs on 96% of imports of
scientific equipment within three years of accession; 
CRS-13
! bind tariffs for about 90% of the tariff lines pertaining to agriculture
and construction equipment at 5% or less and on all wood products
at an average of 4%;
! lift restrictions on imports of commercially available goods that
include encryption technology;
! reduce export duties on ferrous and other scrap metals by up to 51%
of current duty levels within five to seven years of its accession; and
! require state-owned and controlled enterprises to a make purchases,
that are not for government use, on commercial terms.
Regarding trade in agriculture products, Vietnam has committed to:
! reduce tariffs on about 3/4 of U.S. agricultural products (including
beef, pork, dairy, fruits, nuts, processed foods, soybean products,
cotton and hides and skins, and grains) to rates of 15% or lower from
an average applied rate of 27%;
! adhere to the WTO agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, meaning that its measures will have to be science-based
upon accession; 
! recognize the U.S. food safety inspection regimes for beef, poultry,
and pork as equivalent to is own, thus eliminating the need for
duplicative inspections; and 
!  permit imports of bone-in beef and beef offal after the signing of the
agreement (even before accession to the WTO). 
The bilateral agreement also includes commitments in services trade under
which Vietnam has agreed to:
! allow foreign banks, as of April 1, 2007, to establish 100%-owned
subsidiaries in Vietnam; 
! permit foreign securities firms to establish joint ventures with up to
49% foreign ownership as of the date of accession and 100% foreign
-owned subsidiaries five years after accession, and allow foreign
securities firms to have branches in Vietnam for some securities
activities;
! grant national (non-discriminatory) treatment to foreign financial
firms in all financial services subsectors;
! allow upon accession foreign-owned insurance companies to operate
100% foreign-owned subsidiaries and permit, five years after
accession, foreign insurance companies to open direct branches that
sell non-life insurance; 
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! eliminate all restrictions on foreign insurance company sales of any
line of insurance product one year after accession;
! extend national treatment to foreign insurance companies operating
in Vietnam; and 
! open its markets to foreign providers of telecommunications, energy,
express delivery, transportation, business, distribution,
environmental, and hotel and restaurant services.
During the bilateral negotiations, the two sides discussed Vietnam’s restrictions
on imports of printed media products, including Bibles.  It is unclear whether the
bilateral accession agreement deals with this issue and/or whether the issue will be
discussed by the Working Party.
Vietnam’s Accession Status
 
  It should be noted that the bilateral agreement with the United States  is only
one of 28 bilateral accession agreements that Vietnam has signed.  The conditions
that Vietnam has agreed to under all the bilateral agreements would apply to
Vietnam’s trade with all other WTO members, including the United States.  The
provisions of the bilateral agreements are combined to become part of the protocol
of accession for Vietnam.
In addition to the bilateral agreements, Vietnam still has to complete the
negotiations with the 63-member WTO working party.  Intellectual property rights
protection has been a concern of the United States and some other working party
members.  Vietnam recently passed a new IPR law and the working party members
are waiting to see the regulations on how the law will be implemented.    A number
of contentious issues have arisen during these negotiations.    For example, Vietnam
had insisted that it be granted a period of time within which its obligations under the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) are phased in
rather than imposed immediately upon accession.  Vietnam argued that as a
developing country it was entitled to this special and differential treatment. The
working party members have resisted this demand. 
Working party members also raised issue with the Vietnam government’s policy
of discriminating against companies in Vietnam that have  foreign-ownership and
domestically-owned enterprises in extending importing rights.  Vietnam allows
locally-owned firms to import products that are part of their product line and does not
require them to obtain an import license.  Foreign-owned firms can only import
goods that are used as inputs in final production or that would be used in establishing
an enterprise.  Working party members are waiting see how Vietnam would resolve
this issue of discrimination.  Under the 2001 U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement
(BTA), Vietnam granted U.S.-owned firms special trading rights not accorded to
other foreign-owned firms.  However, once Vietnam accedes to the WTO, it cannot
discriminate among WTO members nor between foreign and domestically-owned
firms.  
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Some working party members have also raised the issue of Vietnam’s ban on
certain types of printed matter that contain “culturally reactionary and superstitious
material,” They are concerned that the restriction might be used to prevent imports
of Bibles.
Implications for the U.S.-Vietnam Trading Relationship
Vietnam’s accession would likely mean changes in how the two countries
conduct their trade relations.  Unless, the United States chooses to invoke the non-
application provision of the WTO (Article XIII), the two countries will be bound by
WTO rules.  In practice this would mean, for example, that the United States would
not be able to impose unilateral restrictions on imports from Vietnam, such as quotas
on apparel imports, unless they have been sanctioned by the WTO.
In addition, the two countries will be able to use the dispute settlement body to
challenge one another’s the trade practices, if they suspect those practices violate
WTO rules.  For example, Vietnam might challenge U.S. antidumping measures
against Vietnamese imports or the U.S. might challenge Vietnam’s trade-distorting
subsidies.       
Overall Significance of the Issues for Vietnam and
United States
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO arguably has been the focal point for the
general improvement and deepening of U.S.-Vietnam relations that has occurred over
the past three to five years.  This trend was symbolized in June 2005, when President
Bush hosted Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai at the White House — the
first trip to the United States by a Vietnamese head of state — and the two spoke of
their desire to move bilateral relations to “a higher plane.” President Bush also
publicly backed Vietnam’s bid to join the WTO.   A variety of economic, strategic,
and historical factors are motivating the two countries to improve relations and obtain
Vietnam’s membership in the WTO.
U.S. Interests
Economically, PNTR and WTO accession for Vietnam obviously has much less
significance for the United States than it does for Vietnam given the small share in
U.S. trade (0.3%) that Vietnam occupies.  Nevertheless, the twin issues can be
considered as steps in fulfilling broader U.S. trade and foreign policy objectives.  In
the trade area, PNTR status for Vietnam is consistent with the policy of the Bush
Administration and the Clinton Administration before it to normalize trade relations
with former adversaries, most prominently China but also Cambodia, Laos, and the
former communist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Vietnam’s
accession to the WTO could help the United States manage its trading relationship
with Vietnam in that Vietnam would be obligated to WTO rules thus providing some
discipline in the relationship.
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Vietnam: A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies, March 6, 2005.
In addition, the United States has been strengthening trade ties with East Asian
countries with a free trade agreement with Singapore and free trade agreement
negotiations with Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia.  The United States is also
undertaking an initiative to strengthen economic ties with the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Vietnam is a member,
as a counterweight to the growing influence of China.  
As for Vietnam’s intrinsic economic importance to the United States, it
represents to certain U.S. export sectors a potentially large (80 million people)
developing market.  For most of the past twenty years, since doi moi (renovation)
economic reforms were launched in 1986, Vietnam has been one of the world’s
fastest-growing economies, generally averaging around 7%-8% real annual gross
domestic product (GDP) growth.11  Additionally, Vietnam’s relatively low wages and
highly educated population appeal to some U.S. multinational corporations that see
Vietnam as an important site for foreign direct investment (FDI), often as a way to
avoid an over-reliance upon factories and suppliers in China.  Nike, for instance, has
an extensive presence in Vietnam.  Vietnam is thought by some to be an attractive
export and investment opportunity in a variety of sectors, including computer
hardware and services, telecommunications equipment and services, and energy-
related machinery and services.12
In addition to fulfilling some commercial objectives, U.S. PNTR and support
for Vietnam’s WTO accession Vietnam are seen by many as tools to meet certain
foreign policy objectives.  For example, they can serve important tools for the United
States to expand cooperation with a country that has an ambivalent relationship with
China.  While the United States is not actively promoting the development of
multiparty democracy in Vietnam, WTO membership is believed by many to be a
important means to promote increased pluralism, accountability, and adherence to the
“rule of law” in Vietnam’s political system.  PNTR also has symbolic significance
as milestone in a series of steps to normalize relations with Vietnam and to place
greater distance from the legacy of the Vietnam war that this and previous
administrations have undertaken.  Finally, in the near term, President Bush is
scheduled to attend the November 2006 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit in Hanoi.  Given the Bush Administration’s desire to upgrade U.S.-Vietnam
relations, it is likely that the President would like to complete the PNTR process by
the time of his visit. 
Vietnam’s Interests
For Vietnam, it is believed that joining the WTO will have significant economic
effects, despite the fact that Vietnam already enjoys NTR status with its major trading
partners, including the United States.  An important example is Vietnamese clothing
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the expiration of the global system of import quotas on textile and apparel products for
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14 Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment, The Impact of the U.S.-Vietnam
Bilateral Trade Agreement on Overall and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam,
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support for the development of the Report.  Economist Intelligence Unit, Vietnam Country
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15 Steve Parker, of the U.S.-Vietnam STAR Project, is the source for this insight during
conversations held in October 2003 with Mark Manyin.
industry, which is expected to experience a significant boost in exports if Vietnam
joins the WTO.13  In 2005, the apparel industry’s contribution to Vietnam’s total
exports was about 15%.  WTO entry is expected to give a boost to inward FDI, by
further entrenching and expanding not only Vietnam’s integration into the global
economy but also its own domestic economic reforms. U.S. companies have been
major investors in Vietnam.  Since 1988, U.S.-related FDI has been over $2.5 billion.
From 2002-04, U.S. companies invested more in Vietnam than firms from any other
country.14
Additionally,  joining the WTO fits Vietnam’s broader economic strategy.
Since the late 1980s, Vietnam has become increasingly dependent upon foreign trade
in general, and in particular with the United States, which is now Vietnam’s largest
export market.  (See Table 1 and Table 2) In the 1990s and early 2000s, as Vietnam
deepened its integration into the global economy and as global trade rules expanded,
Vietnam was forced to commit to an “open market industrialization” strategy.  By
entering into a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the United States,  (a condition
for obtaining conditional NTR from the United States),  by pushing to join the WTO,
and by participating in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Vietnam is attempting
to achieve its goal of becoming an industrialized country by 2020 in effect without
the benefits of protectionism and subsidization that the East Asian tigers employed
in an earlier era.15  A major presumed motivation for continued economic reforms is
finding employment for the over 1 million new entrants to the labor force every year.
Indeed, job creation is perhaps is the key to the vibrancy of the ruling Vietnamese
Communist Party (VCP), as economic growth increasingly becomes its main source
of legitimacy. 
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Table 2.  Vietnam’s Growing Dependency on Trade
1991 1996 2001 2005
Export/GDP Ratio 24% 30% 46% 62%
Imports/GDP Ratio 25% 42% 44% 65%
Total Trade/GDP
Ratio 49% 72% 90% 127%
Source: Derived from Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, various years.
Table 3.  Vietnam’s Growing Dependency on Trade with the
United States
 1996 2001 2004
Percentage of Vietnam’s Total
Exports Going to the U.S. 3.6% 7.2% 18.8%
Vietnam’s Exports to U.S. as a
Percentage of Vietnamese GDP 1.3% 3.3%   9.7%
Source: Derived Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, various years.
Entry into the WTO appears to have broad support in leadership circles in
Vietnam,  despite the economic hardship that is expected to come to Vietnamese
state-owned enterprises and private firms facing reduced state subsidies and
increased competition from abroad. Hanoi’s decision to sign the BTA in 2000
appears to have been a cathartic moment for domestic debates about economic
policy.  Prior to the signing of the BTA, the reformist momentum was widely
observed to have dissipated, in large measure due to perhaps the worst infighting and
political deadlock Vietnam had experienced since reunification.  The deadlock can
be simplified as disagreements between reformers and conservatives over how far to
continue the economic reforms and concomitant integration into the international
community.  Many conservatives feared that  economic rationalization would
increase unemployment, in particular by forcing the government to curtail subsidies
to state-owned enterprises.  Conservatives also felt that economic reform would
affect Vietnam’s sovereignty and undermine the “socialist foundations” of the
country’s economic and political systems and thereby erode the VCP’s monopoly on
power. Vietnam’s consensus-based decision-making style, combined with the
absence of any paramount leader, only exacerbated the effect of these divisions.  
These arguments were brought to a head during the debate over whether to sign
the BTA with the United States, a decision that took more than a year after an
agreement in principle had been reached.  The BTA broke the policymaking logjam
a new political consensus emerged in favor of reform that new leaders endorsed at
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VCP’s 9th Party Congress in 2001.  In short order after signing the BTA, the
government enacted a series of measures, including passing a new Enterprise Law
to give a boost to privately-owned businesses, passing a constitutional amendment
giving legal status to the private sector, reducing red tape, creating unprecedented
transparency rules for prior publication of new rules and regulations, and for the first
time giving party members the green light to engage in private business.  In sum,
many observers agree that for the foreseeable future, Vietnam has embraced deeper
integration into the global economy as the key to the country’s economic policy. 
Potential Issues Regarding PNTR for Vietnam
 
As the debate over PNTR for Vietnam and discussion Vietnam’s accession to
the WTO proceed, a number of issues have already been raised or are likely to be
raised.  Because PNTR and WTO accession are ostensibly about trade, some of the
debate will likely center on trade-related issues.  Probably the most controversial
issue will be Vietnam’s exports of wearing apparel.  But the debate will also likely
touch on non-trade, non-economic issues.  For example, questions will also likely be
raised regarding Vietnam’s record on human rights and policies on religious freedom
and the value of U.S.-Vietnam cooperation in the diplomatic and military/security
areas.  
Imports of Vietnamese Apparel
The accession agreement contains no restrictions on Vietnamese clothing
exports to the United States, but Vietnam agreed to terminate all funding under a
major textile subsidy program upon the date of formal U.S. and Vietnam government
approval.  Textile and apparel quotas now applied to Vietnam will be removed upon
accession; Vietnam has agreed to eliminate all of its WTO-prohibited textile/apparel
subsidy programs by the date of accession; and textile and apparel quotas can be re-
imposed for one year if Vietnam does not eliminate textile and apparel subsidy
programs.
U.S. textile groups had pushed for either the extension of current import quotas
on Vietnam’s textile and apparel exports not subject to WTO disciplines, or the
creation of a safeguard mechanism similar to the one included in China’s accession
agreement. Among the major elements of that agreement were (a) the United States
(and other WTO members) retain the right to impose safeguard measures specifically
applying to textiles and apparel through the end of 2008, allowing continuation of
some quotas in cases where a surge in Chinese exports cause or threaten to cause
market disruption to domestic producers, and (b) China will significantly lower its




after it joined the WTO. China officially joined the WTO on December 11, 2001, and the
President extended PNTR status to China on December 27, 2001. P.L. 106-286 also requires
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to annually issue a report assessing China’s
compliance with its WTO trade obligations.
17 “USTR Cool to Textile Industry Demands for Vietnam Safeguard,” Inside U.S. Trade,
May 5, 2006.  “U.S., Vietnam Reach Bilateral WTO Agreement; Textile Groups Blast Pact,”
International Trade Reporter, May 18, 2006.  
18  Despite this disadvantage, however, the value of Vietnamese clothing imports increased
from 2004 to 2005 by just over 6%, whereas imports of clothing into the United States from
all countries increased by around 6.8%.  (Percentages were computed using the Harmonized
Tariff System codes 61, 62, 63, and 65)
19 American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition.  Press Statement.  Bush Administration
Reaches WTO Accession Agreement with Vietnam.  U.S. Industry Will be Big Losers.  May
15, 2006.
The industry wanted the accession agreement to allow restraints to be imposed
in the future in the event of a surge of imports of apparel from Vietnam, but with
streamlined procedures that would promote quicker action. That safeguard would be
lifted once Vietnam eliminated its export subsidies.  U.S. officials reportedly have
insisted that such an issue must be addressed in the multilateral working party
negotiations, without making a specific commitment to do so, according to informed
sources.17  Under the industry’s proposal the restrictions would stay in place until
Vietnam eliminates its export subsidy programs.
It is unlikely, however, that future increases in Vietnamese exports of clothing
to the United States would be high as they have been recently.  Because Vietnam is
not a WTO member, many observers believe that the expiration of import quotas on
textile and apparel products for WTO members on January 1, 2005, puts Vietnam’s
apparel industry at a disadvantage versus its competitors that now operate under a
quota-free regimen.18 
The U.S. textile and apparel industry is not satisfied and strongly opposes the
bilateral agreement because, according to industry representatives, it will allow
imports of subsidized Vietnamese textiles and apparel into the United States and
unfairly compete with U.S. producers.  Auggie Tantillo, the president of the
American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition said:
“The U.S. textile industry explicitly told the Administration that it would not
support any agreement with Vietnam that did not include adequate safeguards
because Vietnam has a non-market communist economy with a heavily
subsidized state-owned textile industry just like China.  There are no adequate
safeguards in this deal.  In its present form, we are left with no choice but to urge
Congress to oppose this flawed agreement.”19       
USTR officials, when asked why the agreement does not include a safeguard
mechanism similar to one included in the agreement with China, have responded that
while textile and apparel imports from Vietnam are increasing, Vietnam is a much
smaller producer and exporter of those products than is China and would not pose the
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U.S. and Vietnam Negotiators on WTO Accession Agreement,” May 15, 2006; National
Retail Federation. “Retailers Welcome Trade Agreement With Vietnam,” May 31, 2006..
22 For more on these topics, see CRS Report RL33316, U.S.-Vietnam Relations.
competitive threat that China does.  In addition, the officials stated that once Vietnam
has entered the WTO, the United States would have available the dispute settle
mechanism with which to resolve issues with Vietnam.20  
In contrast to the criticism by U.S. apparel manufacturers, U.S. retailers and
apparel importers supported the negotiations and approve of the accession agreement,
seeing it as an opener to lower-priced merchandise, an enforcer of a more level
playing field, and a reducer of uncertainty.  Thus, both the United States Association
of Importers of Textiles and Apparel and the National Retail Federation issued press
releases praising the agreement.21 Proponents of the agreement argue that consumers
would benefit from lower prices on wearing apparel that would result from increased
imports of wearing apparel from Vietnam.
Human Rights and Religious Freedom22
In recent years, Congress has devoted considerable attention to Vietnam’s
human rights record Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state ruled by the
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP).  Since at least the late 1990s, the VCP appears
to have followed a strategy of generally relaxing most restrictions on most forms of
personal and religious expression while selectively repressing individuals and
organizations that it deems a threat to the party’s monopoly on political power.
Vietnamese living in the country’s urban areas generally enjoy wide and expanding
latitude to exercise their civil, economic, and religious liberties.  In contrast,
conditions are more restrictive in more rural areas, particularly in the country’s
Central Highlands and northwestern regions.  The government has cracked down
harshly on anti-government protests by various ethnic minority groups, most
prominently the Montagnards in the country’s Central Highlands, where clashes
between protestors and government security forces have flared periodically since
2001.  Both areas are populated by ethnic minority groups, among which are many
who belong to non-registered Protestant denominations.  
Many observers have pointed to evidence of improvements in the general human
rights situation in Vietnam in 2005 and 2006, even as conditions remain difficult for
certain individuals, groups, and in certain regions.  In the Central Highlands, there
are signs that the level of government repression has diminished since April 2004,
when thousands of protesting Montagnard tribal groups reportedly clashed violently
with police and local authorities.  The State Department’s 2005 report on human
rights in Vietnam, released in March 2006, describes the Vietnamese government’s
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human rights record “unsatisfactory,” an improvement over past reports, which had
used the term “poor.”23 
Religious Freedom.  Although the freedom to worship generally exists in
Vietnam, the government strictly regulates and monitors the activities of religious
organizations, and periodically has increased restrictions on certain ones.
Vietnamese law requires religious groups to join one of the officially-recognized
religious organizations or denominations.  According to many reports, the
government uses this process to monitor and restrict the operations of religious
organizations.  Additionally, many groups either refuse to join one of the official
religious orders or are denied permission to do so, meaning that these groups’
activities technically are illegal.  
In 2004, the State Department designated VIETNAM for the first time a
“country of particular concern,” (CPC) principally because of reports of worsening
harassment of certain groups of ethnic minority Protestants and Buddhists.  To the
surprise of many, the Vietnamese government responded by negotiating with the
Bush Administration and adopting some internal changes.  After months of talks, in
the spring of 2005, the United States and Vietnam reached a controversial agreement
on religious freedom, in which Hanoi agreed to take steps that were designed to
improve conditions for people of faith, particularly in the Central Highlands.  The
agreement, which has not been released publicly, enabled Vietnam to avoid punitive
consequences, such as sanctions, associated with its CPC designation.  The
agreement has been faulted by human rights groups on a number of grounds,
including the charge that religious persecution continues in the Central Highlands.
Vietnam was redesignated a CPC in the 2005 Religious Freedom Report.
The Vietnam Human Rights Act.  Some Members of Congress have
attempted to link U.S. aid to the human rights situation in Vietnam.  The most
prominent example, the Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 3190 in the 109th
Congress), proposes capping existing non-humanitarian U.S. assistance programs to
the Vietnamese government at FY2005 levels if the President does not certify that
Vietnam is making “substantial progress” in human rights, including religious
freedom.  
Diplomatic and Military Issues
Prime Minister’s Trip to the United States.  Vietnam and the United
States gradually have been expanding their political and security ties, though these
have lagged far behind the economic aspect of the relationship.  In the past four
years, Vietnam’s leadership appears to have decided to expand their country’s
political and security ties to the United States.  During Vietnamese Prime Minister
Phan Van Khai’s visit to the United States in June 2005, he and President Bush spoke
of their desire to move bilateral relations to “a higher plane,” Bush backed Vietnam’s
bid to enter the WTO, and pledged to visit Vietnam when it hosts the 2006 Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.  The two countries also signed an
International Military Education Training (IMET) agreement and announced an
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agreement to resume U.S. adoptions of Vietnamese children, which Hanoi halted in
2002.  Protesters, including many Vietnamese-Americans, appeared at every stop on
Khai’s trip.
Security and Military Ties.  Since the late 1990s, U.S. officials have
expressed an interest in expanding security and military ties.  Vietnam generally was
cool to the idea, reportedly for two reasons:  certain Vietnamese officials were wary
of antagonizing China and some in the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense were
concerned about outside scrutiny of its officers for human rights abuses.  Over the
past two years, however, Hanoi has become more responsive to U.S. entreaties, as
symbolized by the signing of an IMET agreement in 2005, under which two
Vietnamese officers will attend in 2006 a U.S. air force language school in Texas for
English  classes.  In June 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited
Vietnam and reportedly agreed with his Vietnamese counterpart to increase military-
to-military cooperation and exchanges.  According to Rumsfeld, the two sides
discussed additional medical exchanges, an expansion of U.S. de-mining programs,
and additional English language training for troops taking part in international
peacekeeping missions.24  According to one report, the Vietnamese inquired about
acquiring certain U.S. military equipment and spare parts.25 
POW/MIA Issues
Opposition to granting PNTR to Vietnam may also come from individuals and
groups who argue that Vietnam has not done enough to account for U.S. Prisoners
of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) from the Vietnam War.  This argument has
diminished markedly since the mid-1990s, when the United States and Vietnam
began devoting increased resources to POW/MIA research and analysis.  By 1998 a
substantial permanent staff in Vietnam was deeply involved in frequent searches of
aircraft crash sites and discussions with local Vietnamese witnesses throughout the
country.  The Vietnamese authorities also have allowed U.S. analysts access to
numerous POW/MIA-related archives and records.  The U.S. Defense Department
has reciprocated by allowing Vietnamese officials access to U.S. records and maps
to assist their  search for Vietnamese MIAs.  The increased efforts have led to
substantial understanding about the fate of several hundred of the over 2,000
Americans still unaccounted for in Indochina. On September 21, 1998, U.S.
Ambassador to Vietnam Peterson told the media that “it is very, very, very unlikely
that you would expect to see any live Americans discovered in Vietnam, Cambodia,
or Laos.”  Official U.S. policy, however, does not remove a name from the rolls of
those unaccounted for unless remains are identified.26  During Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld’s June 2006 trip to Vietnam, the two countries discussed expanding their
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cooperation on recovering remains, including the possibility of using more advanced
technology to locate, recover, and identify remains located under water.27
Conclusion: Legislation and Possible Approaches 
for Congress
Congress usually has no legislative role in the accession of countries to the
WTO.  However, the legislative requirement for repeal of Title IV, including the
Jackson-Vanik amendment, provides an indirect  role, regarding Vietnam’s accession
to the WTO.  Members may use their votes on PNTR for Vietnam to indicate their
respective positions on Vietnam’s accession or on U.S. policy toward Vietnam in
general.    
Regarding the legislation on PNTR,  Congress has several options.  Congress
could repeal the restrictions before Vietnam actually enters the WTO, completely
separating the issues of Title IV repeal and WTO accession.  This is the course laid
out in the two bills were introduced on June 13, 2006, S. 3495 (Baucus) and H.R.
5602 (Ramstad).  On July 31, the Senate Finance Committee approved S. 3495 (18-0
with two Senators voting present).  Subsequently, a hold was placed on further
consideration of the bill in the Senate.28 This is also the course that Congress has
followed in most cases to date and would allow the United States to fulfill the
unconditional MFN requirement prior  the country acceding to the WTO.  Vietnam
regards Jackson-Vanik as a cold war relic that has no applicability to its  current
emigration policies.  Vietnam asserts that its should be treated as normal U.S. trade
partner and, therefore, the restrictions should be removed unconditionally.  On the
other hand, some Members of Congress have raised concerns regarding trade,
economic, and other Vietnamese policies and practices and may view the PNTR as
leverage in addressing these issues.
A second approach would be for Congress to link the granting of PNTR to
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO.   For example, Congress could follow the model
established with PNTR for China by requiring the President, before it can grant
PNTR, to certify that the conditions under which  Vietnam would enter the WTO are
at least equivalent to the conditions that the United States agreed to under its bilateral
accession agreement with Vietnam.  It can be argued that in this way, Congress
helped define, at least indirectly, the conditions under which Vietnam entered the
WTO.  However, Vietnam might bridle at such treatment asserting that they would
be asked to overcome hurdles that are not applied to most of the other acceding
countries, especially countries not subject to Jackson-Vanik. 
A third option would for Congress to not repeal the Title IV at all, as is the case
currently with the former Soviet republic of Moldova.  This option would send a
strong message to Vietnam  of congressional concerns or discontent with its policies
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or practices without preventing the country’s entrance into the WTO.  At the same
time, the United States would have to invoke the non-applicability provision (Article
XIII) of the WTO in its trade relations with that country.  The United States may not
benefit from the concessions that the partner country made in order to accede to the
WTO.29  The United States would not be bound by WTO rules in its trade relations
with the Vietnam nor would Vietnam so bound in its trade with the United States.
For example, the WTO dispute settlement body mechanism would not be available
to the two countries in their bilateral trade relationship.
Yet another option is that Congress could vote to grant PNTR to Vietnam while
also approving companion legislation that deals with human rights conditions in
Vietnam.  This was the course of action the House took in 2001, when on the same
day the House approved the BTA, it also passed a version of the Vietnam Human
Rights Act, (H.R. 2833, by a vote of 410-1), which linked increases (over FY2001
levels) in non-humanitarian aid to the Vietnamese government to  the President’s
certification that Vietnam was making “substantial progress” in human rights. H.R.
2833 did not receive floor action in the Senate.  The Congress could also attach
reporting requirements on POW/MIA, human rights, or other issues as part of the
PNTR legislation. 
Any option the Congress would choose to exercise have to avoid placing direct
conditions on extending NTR status to Vietnam in order not to violate the
unconditional MFN principle of the WTO.  In addition, in determining which option
to exercise, the Congress faces the balance of  costs and benefits of each.
Furthermore, how the Congress treats Vietnam  relative to the  other countries still
subject to Jackson-Vanik  could have implications for U.S. relations.  For example,
Russia might consider it a serious affront if Vietnam were granted PNTR status on
more favorable terms than Russia.
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Appendix A. U.S. Imports of Apparel, Top 10
Countries of Origin
(millions of dollars)
Country 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
China 7279 8597 9250 10997 13106 19298
Mexico 5317 8112 7718 7178 6930 6307
Hong Kong 4021 4278 3924 3755 3915 3550
India 1505 1941 2063 2170 2368 3158
Indonesia 1656 2284 2103 2173 2407 2874
Vietnam 26 48 896 2375 2565 2731
Honduras 1689 2438 2503 2569 2745 2686
Bangladesh 1442 2101 1887 1849 1978 2373
Dominican
Republic
2234 2285 2176 2134 2063 1852
Philippines 1617 1914 1834 1864 1807 1847
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note: Data are for merchandise trade on a customs value basis, using the North American Industrial
Classification System. Countries are listed in order of 2005 ranking. 
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Appendix B. U.S. Imports from Vietnam of Selected Apparel Items
(millions of dollars, except where indicated)




Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waistcoats, and similar articles, knitted or
crocheted
a
8 195 508 454 440 31%
Women’s or girls’ trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches, and shorts of
woven textile fabrics
1 4 109 347 282 352 46%
Men’s or boys’ trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches, and shorts of
woven textile fabrics
a
1 87 294 188 210 63%
Men’s or boys’ overcoats, carcoats, capes, anoraks (incl. ski jackets), etc.
(except suit-type jackets and blazers) of woven fabrics
a a
61 141 224 178 -3%
Men’s or boys’ shirts of woven textile materials 7 11 39 98 132 146 -6%
Women’s or girls’ overcoats, carcoats, capes, anoraks (incl. ski jackets),
etc. (except suit-type jackets) of woven textile fabrics
a a
48 97 167 133 -27%
Men’s or boys’ shirts of knitted or crocheted textile fabrics 2 7 45 112 122 116 4%
Women’s or girls’ suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, dresses, skirts,
divided skirts, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts of knit
textile fabrics
1 1 58 112 93 107 36%
Garments of felt and other nonwoven fabrics or of other textile fabrics
coated or impregnated with plastics, rubber, etc.
a a
23 33 100 104 47%
Women’s or girls’ blouses, shirts, and shirt blouses of knitted or crocheted
textile fabrics
2 4 26 81 88 88 39%
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note: Product categories are based upon the Standard Industrial Trade Classification.
a Less than $500,000.
